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Abstract. The recent proliferation of smart home environments offers new and 
transformative circumstances for various domains with a commitment to en-
hancing the quality of life and experience of their inhabitants. However, most of 
these environments combine different gadgets offered by multiple stakeholders 
in a dynamic and decentralized manner, which in turn presents new challenges 
from the perspective of digital investigation. In addition, a plentiful amount of 
data records got generated because of the day-to-day interactions between smart 
home’s gadgets and homeowners, which poses difficulty in managing and ana-
lyzing such data. The analysts should endorse new digital investigation ap-
proaches and practices to tackle the current limitations in traditional digital in-
vestigations when used in these environments. The digital evidence in such en-
vironments can be found inside the records of log-files that store the historical 
events and various actions occurred inside the smart home. Threat hunting can 
leverage the collective nature of these gadgets, the vengeful artifacts observed 
on smart home environments can be shared between each other to gain deeper 
insights into the best way for responding to new threats, which in turn can be 
valuable in reducing the impact of breaches. Nevertheless, this approach de-
pends mainly on the readiness of smart homeowners to share their own personal 
usage logs that have been extracted from their smart home environments. How-
ever, they might disincline to employ such service due to the sensitive nature of 
the information logged by their personal gateways. In this paper, we presented 
an approach to enable smart homeowners to share their usage logs in a privacy-
preserving manner. A distributed threat hunting approach has been developed to 
elicit the various threat reputations with effective privacy guarantees. The pro-
posed approach permits the composition of diverse threat classes without re-
vealing the logged records to other involved parties. Furthermore, a scenario 
was proposed to depict a proactive threat Intelligence sharing for the detection 
of potential threats in smart home environments with some experimental results. 
Keywords: Smart Home. IoT, Secure-Multiparty Computation, Privacy, Threat 
Hunting. Digital Investigations 
1 Introduction 
The emergence of smart connected things that contain resource-constrained em-
bedded systems with autonomous capabilities to enable connecting with other sur-
rounding things and be self-aware of their internal states or external environment, has 
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recently evolved into what is recently recognized as the internet of things. With the 
various wired and wireless communication technologies currently exist to facilitate 
connectivity between these heterogeneous devices, an increasing number of resource-
constrained objects are getting connected with each other. These objects also have the 
capability of interacting with people, where they can collect data from people's every-
day activities, then the collected data got exchanged with each other or remote ser-
vices on the internet. Because of this feature, these objects are often titled “smart” and 
can be used as basic building blocks for smart automation systems. The smart home is 
one of the domains of IoT, that is composed of an IoT network of connected systems 
that facilitate connectivity between electronic sensors, analytical software and me-
chanical actuators inside the physical home environment [1]. The kind of setup, em-
power the smart homeowners with the ability to get notifications, to apply control and 
automate various activities performed within the home’s perimeter. This also has an 
impact on enhancing the quality of daily chores from anywhere at any time through a 
smartphone application and an internet connection [2]. The progress of IoT-based 
smart home environments is currently gaining an increased momentum due to the 
wide range of improvements in the development of wireless protocols, embedded 
systems, cloud technologies, and the availability of internet-enabled smartphones. 
Most large businesses launching their own products to gain a share in this potential 
market and to inspire the advance of the next smart home ecosystem e.g., Nest smart 
thermostat, Apple HomeKit, Siri and Alexa enabled devices. These smart devices 
hold valuable digital data [3], potentially targeted by invasion attacks from external 
actors. Additionally, Smart home environments are frequently being targeted as well. 
It has been noticed a gradual increase in practices and available resources in relation 
to exploiting the vulnerabilities within smart home’ devices. Since most of The IoT 
devices within Smart homes have a large number of vulnerabilities in their protocols, 
firmware, and software. Attackers are always ready to abuse these vulnerabilities to 
gather, alter or delete private information of smart-home owners or damage their IoT 
systems. The current security techniques are not 100% effective in the face of these 
increasing attacks. The threats dynamics for the smart home environment are very 
high, almost new vulnerabilities or unusual exploits are getting discovered daily in 
these systems. Data from different IoT systems of a smart home can be logged in 
different formats. From a threat hunting perspective, such logged data about various 
events in the IoT systems can give an indication about the behaviors and functionali-
ties of these systems. In our work, we refer to IoT-based smart home environments as 
smart home. 
Digital investigations are scientifically proven methods concerned with examina-
tion and analysis of digital evidence. The success of these tasks is highly depending 
on the ability of the forensic investigators to analyze large volumes of digital forensic 
data to locate suitable evidence. This, in turn, will require massive computational 
resources because of the size of the involved data. With the increasing cases of cyber-
crimes utilizing IoT devices [4], the need for applying digital investigations into IoT 
domain became indispensable. Since, the new IoT paradigm has been exposed to 
various vulnerabilities, which can induce a new type of cybercrimes that is accom-
plishable through these devices. However, it is necessary to adapt the processes of 
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digital investigations when being applied into IoT scenarios, due to certain character-
istics imposed by the IoT paradigm that make it different from other contexts, such as 
the increasing number of connected devices, the heterogeneity, diversity of collected 
data formats, and proprietary protocols of connected devices requires type-specific 
evidence retrieval tools, and the resource-constrained nature of these connected de-
vices. Hence, existing digital investigations tools cannot successfully be applied to 
this paradigm without considering these features. IoT Forensics [5] is a relatively new 
term that characterizes a new paradigm in the digital investigations committed to 
implementing forensic practices for the collection and analysis of evidence from the 
peculiarities of Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructure. This new paradigm follows the 
well-established principles of traditional computer forensics, particularly targeting 
identification, acquisition, preservation, analysis, and reporting of digital evidence. 
Nonetheless, IoT forensics faces many challenges due to the inadequacy of currently 
usable computer forensics tools and methodologies in the IoT realms [6]. Further-
more, the tremendous amount of diversified data generated by the IoT devices poses a 
substantial challenge for the digital investigators to smoothly determine the precise 
portion of crucial data required for further analysis and examinations [7]. The poten-
tial evidence source in IoT forensics may include household appliances, health and 
fitness devices, entertainment systems, connected home hubs, Home monitor-
ing/security systems, and outdoor gadgets, among others. While, in traditional com-
puter forensics the potential evidence source can be computers, main servers, net-
working devices or mobile phones. In respect of the particular kind of the digital evi-
dence that can be found, in IoT forensics, the digital evidence can exist in a standard 
or proprietary format, unlike the traditional computer forensics where the digital evi-
dence mostly exists in standard formats. The last challenging factor in IoT forensics is 
the complex hardware architecture and diverse operating systems these gadgets have, 
along with monopolistic protocols and hardware that are subject to unclear standards. 
One of the recent emerging themes in digital investigations is threat hunting, which 
is a preemptive cyber-defense activity that involves iterative searching through net-
works to detect sophisticated threats or potential vulnerabilities that elude existing 
security solutions, which differs from the current approaches that depend on passive 
waiting for cyber threats that might be detected if a violation in the previously config-
ured conditions occurred inside any of the deployed network security solutions (IDS, 
IPS, SIEMS). The proactive approach can profoundly support the creation of a strong 
digital perimeter that continuously tracks pieces of evidence of new penetrative 
threats or malicious activities on the smart home environment. The threat hunting 
activity crucially relies on the cooperation between various groups of smart home’s 
gadgets to repeatedly collect data to hunt for evidence regarding potential vulnerabili-
ties without halting the functions of a smart home environment. The success of threat 
hunting activity highly depends on the ability of the system to execute threat-based 
security analysis approaches on large volumes of incomplete data from smart home’s 
gadgets to locate suitable evidence, this, in turn, will require a lot of computational 
resources due to the volume of the data involved. The main objective of this research 
is to propose a collaborative threat hunting platform, which aims to share pieces of 
evidence with other smart home environments to facilitate prompt detection of attacks 
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against the smart-home owners, or the infrastructure of the smart environment and for 
mitigation. The proposed platform can have a vast impact on alleviating the need for 
high computational resources, since only high confidence rules and artifacts related to 
attacks observed on other smart home environments will be shared. Furthermore, this 
approach can assist to overcome the complexity of evidence acquisition which might 
be incomplete or inaccurate when getting extracted from a single source. Finally, logs 
from several smart environments’ gadgets collectively support each other since re-
cording the same data in two different logs makes the extracted evidence stronger and 
can guarantee the genuineness of the threat to particular systems. An additional im-
portant requirement for threat hunting that the evidence data collected from various 
smart home environments are going to be processed collaboratively. Hence, scalabil-
ity is essential in order to support the construction of large threat reputations groups 
with semantically enriched information. In order to prevent malicious entities from 
participating in the formation of threat reputations groups, tampering the results or 
compromising smart-home infrastructure to launch other attacks; every smart home 
environment needs to provide a set of credentials or prove identity during any of the 
steps required for the formation of threat reputations groups. 
Most of the threat hunting solutions proposed so far have undervalued the demands 
to protect the privacy of end-users during the whole process of digital investigations. 
This situation has noticed real and significant implications for privacy concerns with 
the advent of IoT devices as an essential part of our daily activities as these gadgets 
are able to harvest and transmit personally identifiable information from every angle 
of our day-to-day activities. Thus, smart-home owners might be reluctant to partici-
pate in threat hunting activity, especially if they feel their own privacy is at stake by 
sharing data within their smart-home environment. These privacy issues that are relat-
ed to threat hunting need to be taken into consideration for the advance of this kind of 
approaches. Most of privacy issues are related to how the data will be distributed and 
which laws govern the sharing of data. Thus, it is necessary to provide a technical 
assurance to smart-homeowners that privacy is guaranteed at all times and the sharing 
of information will not adversely affect their personal and professional reputation [8]. 
It is important that the proposed platform be able to enforce privacy principles in each 
of the phases of threat hunting approach and to provide initial functionality related to 
applying group-based access control and reputation mechanisms, to promote the es-
tablishment of trust between the various unnamed participants.  
In this work, a threat hunting approach was proposed to implicitly elicit the rele-
vant threat reputations groups from the multiple feeds of event logs. This process has 
been designed to be carried at the smart homeowner side. The presented system will 
attain security, privacy for event logs and will help smart homeowners to easily adopt 
a proactive approach for threat hunting. Any event logs collected from smart-home 
environments and shared with our system will be camouflaged using two-stage con-
cealment protocols to preclude any potential risk of data breaches. This proposed 
approach also maintains the privacy of the data influx within the smart home such as 
sensitive usage patterns, events, and conditions, since any released data for threat 
hunting process will be concealed, and the original raw data will be stored in an en-
crypted form and only available for its owner. When the two-stage concealment pro-
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tocols handle the records within the event logs, any beneficial patterns for the threat 
hunting will be eliminated. Therefore, to support the analysis phase of threat hunting 
process on the concealed logs, some selective properties in the collected records have 
to be maintained to ease the ranking process related to threat reputations. This paper 
has been organized as follows, In Section 2, related works were summarized. Section 
3 the proposed system that envisioned at the smart homeowner’s side was outlined. 
The proposed adversary model was presented in section 4. Essential definitions relat-
ed to the problem formulation along with the two-stage concealment protocols real-
ized for the ranking process of threat reputations were explicated in section 5. Section 
6, experimental results were depicted. Finally, the conclusions and future directions 
were given in Section 7. 
2 Related Works 
At present, digital investigation is a well-established technical aspect used by al-
most all big business. The processes of digital investigation begin only after a breach 
occurs. Lately, the attention has deviated from a reactive manner to a more proactive 
one, where security solutions will hunt for threats and vulnerabilities in the system to 
thwart breaches from occurring. The earlier detection of malicious activities or poten-
tial flaws, the better chance of reducing or avoiding future damages that may occur. 
This approach is what is known as threat hunting, which has recently emerged as a 
hot topic in the domain of cyber-security. However, there is a notable lack of litera-
ture review on this new approach. Each cyber-security vendor tends to promote its 
own definition of threat hunting to differentiate their own product as a threat hunting 
solution. In turn, this leads to ambiguity related to this concept. There are many dif-
ferent definitions to explain this term formulated based on its perception within the 
cyber-security community. For example, threat hunting can be defined as the process 
of seeking out adversaries before they can successfully execute an attack [9]. Sqrrl 
refers to threat hunting as a proactive and iterative searching through networks and 
datasets to detect threats that evade existing automated tools [10]. For the purpose of 
this research, threat hunting can briefly be defined as a preemptive activity that seeks 
for indicators of compromise in smart-home environments. The work in [11] pro-
posed a framework that models multi-stage attacks in a way that describe the attack 
methods and the expected consensuses of these attacks. The groundwork of their re-
search is to model behaviors using an Intrusion Kill-Chain attack model and defense 
patterns. The implementation of their proposed framework was employed using 
Apache Hadoop. The authors in [12] presented framework that utilizes text mining 
techniques to actively correlate information between the security-related events and 
the catalogue of attack patterns. The foundation of this work is to reduce analysis time 
and enhance the quality of attack identification. The work in [13] proposed a method-
ology that combines structural anomaly detection from information networks and 
psychological profiling of individuals. The structural anomaly detection uses graph 
analysis and machine learning to identify structural anomalies in various information 
networks, while the psychological profiling dynamically assembles individuals’ psy-
chological profiles from their behavioral patterns. The authors proceed to identify 
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threats through by linking and ranking of the varied results obtained from structural 
anomaly detection and psychological profiling. In [14] an aspect of threat detection 
was introduced, which relies on identifying unexpected changes in edges’ weights 
over time. Wavelet decomposition method was employed to differentiate the transient 
activity from the stationary activity in the edges. The authors in [15] proposed the 
usage of data mining techniques through visual graphical representation to overcome 
different threats. In their research, two new visualization schemes were proposed to 
visualize threats. In [16], a botnet detection framework has been developed, which 
utilizes cluster analysis to characterize similarity patterns of C&C communication and 
activities flows. The proposed framework sniffs the network traffic then executes two 
types of parallel analyses, one analysis is performed for detecting a cluster of hosts 
with similar communication patterns, and the other inspects the packet payloads to 
detect anomalous activities. The activities are later grouped to detect a cluster of hosts 
with similar malicious behavior. A cross-correlation process is utilized to merge the 
results of preceding analyses to produce meaningful groups of malicious hosts that 
might be forming a Botnet. The trade-off between digital investigation and privacy 
was discussed in [17], where the authors proposed privacy preserving forensic attribu-
tion layer to attain a balance between privacy and digital investigation processes. 
Group-based signatures were utilized as a part of their proposed solution to achieve 
the previous goal. Finally, the authors in [18] studied privacy issues in digital investi-
gation and assumed that the forensics investigation process may violate the privacy of 
truthful users. The research work has proposed a protocol to offer privacy to these 
users while holding malicious users liable. 
3 The Proposed System 
The general approach of threat hunting is to log any and all events in its environ-
ment for further analysis. This allows forensic investigators to have more data during 
the correlation analysis of patterns in order to discover malicious behaviors. When the 
amount of collected data increases, this task becomes cumbersome and difficult to 
manage. Within smart home environments, the massive amount of generated data 
poses a restriction on any human-based analysis and calls for new automated ap-
proaches for threat hunting. In this work, clustering analysis will be utilized to infer 
potential future vulnerabilities and to rapidly label events on the smart home to cut 
down on detection time. The cooperative approach was utilized to get more threats 
related data and understand the whole context from nearby smart home environments. 
This in turn, vastly reduces the threat window which needs a further investigation. 
Moreover, the proposed platform actively mitigates these threats using immediate 
notification to the smart homeowner that contains the recommended remediation pro-
cedures along with automatically generating new detection and prevention rules for 
the deployed security solutions at smart homeowner’s side. This offers a complete 
security solution that can be used to benefit new smart homeowners. 
The research conducted on this paper aims to realize privacy by design approach 
[19] in which a middleware was proposed for governing the data privacy during the 
ranking process of threat reputations groups. The homeowners will not be forced to 
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follow a binary subscription system, either to participate in the threat hunting by re-
leasing their raw event logs or opt-out from the whole process. With the proposed 
system, the homeowners now have the capability to sanitize the sensitive information 
in any released event logs. In such a procedure, they will be empowered to disclose 
their data gradually. The proposed system can enable the homeowners to control their 
data that need to be shared with various threat hunting processes. Hence, they have 
the choice to enroll in any threat hunting group with a crafted version of their event 
logs. The key motivation behind our system is to apply a user-centric principle that 
follows the safest approach to preserve the sensitive records at the homeowners’ 
gateways and to not release them in a raw form. Nonetheless, in order to participate in 
threat hunting and to obtain the related set of threat reputations groups, the homeown-
ers should disclose their event logs in a specific way to facilitate the ranking process. 
Our proposed system relies on a middleware approach, that we named a cognitive 
middleware for cooperative threat hunting (CMCTH).  Our middleware is composed 
of multiple cooperative agents and is being hosted in the smart home gateways. The 
collaboration between these different agents is essential to achieve privacy for the 
homeowners’ data. Within CMCTH, every agent has a certain task; a local conceal-
ment agent executes a baseline concealment process which generates a sanitized event 
log by segregating the sensitive events based on end-user's policies. The local mask-
ing agent receives the sanitized event log then engages in the execution of the two-
stage concealment protocols required for the ranking process of threat reputations 
groups. 
The first stage protocol proposed in this research was entitled the secure threat 
ranking (STR), which is a distrusted cryptographic protocol, that is used to compose 
generalize virtual threat groups based on the individual event logs collected from 
different smart home systems. The second stage protocol was named the secure threat 
insights (STI), which takes as an input the virtual threat groups extracted from the 
first stage protocol then proceed to detect a set of real threat groups in every and all 
virtual threat groups. Aggregation topologies were employed in CMCTH to manage 
the data collection process from homeowners’ gateways. The first stage protocol uti-
lizes a simple ring formation topology for its processes and the second stage protocol 
uses a complex hierarchical formation topology for extracting precise real threat 
groups. The selection of these two aggregation topologies is adequate to the different 
steps in every protocol. Our proposed system relies on the existence of a centralized 
threat intelligence server (CTI). CTI is a centralized element on the proposed system 
responsible for initiating the ranking process and storing the final groups extracted 
after every run. CTI also offers a virtual workplace and a proxy for facilitating the 
interaction between smart homes’ gateways of different vendors that might have un-
common communication protocols. The scenario presented in this research is the 
following: based on the several threat categories, CTI generate initial threat reputation 
groups then submit data related to these groups to the smart home’s gateways to veri-
fy if the event logs might have occurrences of these threats. Every gateway is running 
its own CMCTH. CMCTH start the threat hunting process by inciting the local con-
cealment agent to produce a sanitized event log that contains only generalized events 
that are related to their logs while segregating any sensitive events. Since this step 
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cannot guarantee full privacy, CMCTH attempts to conceal these sanitized events by 
executing two-stage concealment protocols during the threat categorization process. 
The final threats ranking get offered based on the relevancy of the published events to 
different extracted threats.  At the end of the threat hunting, CTI will permit the smart 
home’s gateways to participate in a pertinent threat reputation group which will pre-
sent a set of countermeasures to prevent these threats from occurring.  
4 The Assumed Adversary Model 
Our proposed system attains privacy for the sensitive records in the event logs. 
Every entity participating in the threat hunting process is following the semi-honest 
model. Hence, it is obliged to behave in accordance with the processes of the two-
stage concealment protocols, but any intermediate data received from other entities 
could be stored for further investigation. In our model, we considered the centralized 
threat intelligence server (CTI) to act as an untrusted adversary that aims to gather the 
sensitive records in the event logs to be able to infer activities of various homeowners 
and to trace them back. We don’t assume CTI to be an entirely malicious adversary 
which is a practical assumption. CTI is aiming to attain some business goals as well in 
order to boost their profits and reputations in the threat hunting industry. As a meas-
ure for the usefulness of our system, the achieved privacy is considered high only if 
the CTI can’t infer activities of various homeowners from their event logs released for 
the threat hunting process. 
5 The Proposed Concealment Procedure in CMCTH  
We will start this section with outlining a set of significant notions used during this 
research work based on our previous research in [20, 21]. The event logs within our 
system are being presented in two forms, a sanitized event log and a sensitive event 
log. On one hand, the sanitized event log is a generalized version of the sensitive 
event log, where sensitive events get suppressed and other non-sensitive events get 
replaced with a set of hypernym phrases that are in the same semantic level of these 
non-sensitive events. The sanitized event logs can be considered the public data the 
smart homeowners agreed to disclose and released by CMCTH for the threat hunting 
process.  On the other hand, the sensitive event logs stores records of personal events 
that smart homeowners avoid publishing in a raw form for other external entities. 
Privacy should be maintained when performing the ranking process related to threat 
reputations groups. Privacy should also be preserved when the final threats ranking 
get offered to a new entity on the system. The collected event logs used in threat hunt-
ing processes should also be preserved from CTI and/or any external entities involved 
in the whole procedure. In this paper the term “virtual threat group” can be defined: 
Definition 1. A virtual threat group is the set VC = {RC1, RC2, … , RCn} ,where n is 
the number of real threat groups in VC, the virtual threat group has the following 
properties: (1) Each ∀i=1
n RCi ∈ VC has a 3-element tuple RC = {Isg, Vsg, dsg} such 
that Isg = {i1, i2, … , il} presents the set of sanitized events, Vsg = {v1, v2, … , vk} corre-
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sponds to the set of gateways, and dsg ∈ Isg is the main- defining event of RC. (2) For 
every gateway ∀i=1
l vi ∈ Vsg, v have the events Vsg. (3) dsg is the most frequent event 
in Vsg events log, and this event considered as the “core-point” of this real threat 
group RG. (4) For any two real threat groups RCa and RCb (1 ≤ a, b ≤ n and a ≠ b) 
the following conditions are satisfied: Vsga ∩  Vsgb = ∅ and  Isga ≠   Isgb. 
5.1 The Two-Stage Concealment Protocols 
This work presents two-stage concealment protocols that will be used for masking 
the event logs of smart homeowners when being released for threat hunting. The 
CMCTH is the element that is hosted on the gateways of smart homeowners and en-
forces the privacy preservation of the sensitive records on the event logs [22-29]. 
CMCTH will also execute the proposed cryptographic concealment protocols. The 
first stage concealment protocol was named secure threat ranking (STR) and the sec-
ond stage concealment protocol was termed secure threat insights (STI). These proto-
cols will facilitate the secure ranking extraction of threat groups from the masked 
event logs. These protocols will privately offer a ranked list of potential threats to new 
participants based on the relevancy of their released event logs to the different ex-
tracted threat reputation groups. Hence, any newly registered gateway can participate 
in any real threat group in a secure and private manner. The members of the same real 
threat group can share their systems configurations to prevent the occurrence of these 
threats and share information that can aid in handling a certain chain of threats facing 
their crucial systems.  
Secure Threat Ranking (STR) Protocol 
The first stage concealment protocol aims to categorize different event logs into mul-
tiple virtual threat groups. CMCTH will face two challenges when categorizing those 
virtual threat groups. The first challenge is related to the representation of this threat 
group, i.e., an accurate intra-group closeness and a precise intra-group separation need 
to be clear in every extracted virtual threat group. The second challenge is related to 
attaining high privacy level for the sensitive records inside the event logs. Therefore, 
STR takes as an input the sanitized event log that was previously preprocessed by 
local concealment agent. This is a crucial step to maintain higher privacy levels for 
any published records. The sanitized event log is usually formed using public infor-
mation by mapping any released event logs with a set of hypernym phrases obtained 
through taxonomy trees and/or public dictionaries that produce alternative events in 
the same semantic level of the original sensitive events. This process will form what 
is known as a sanitized event log as previously proposed in [20, 21] .  
After generating sanitized event logs, CMCTH invokes the masking agent to run the 
distributed STR protocol to start building virtual threat groups based on the sanitized 
event logs that were submitted by smart homes’ gateways. After running the STR 
protocol, every created virtual threat group will hold the set of smart homes’ gateways 
who are largely sharing a similar set of events in their published event logs. The STR 
protocol gets executed in a distributed way. This protocol starts by organizing smart 
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homes’ gateways in a ring topology. STR protocol utilizes sanitized records published 
by gateway Vc to create an event vector Vc = (ec(w1), … . . ec(wm)), such that m rep-
resents the number of unique events in the event log, and ec(w1) describes the signif-
icance weight of such event w1in gateway Vc (weighted frequency). The next compu-
tation steps utilizes the concept of term frequency inverse log frequency model that 
was presented in [30] as follows: 
Term − frequencyVc(wi) = #wi in Vc log #events in Vc log⁄ , and 
inverse − log − frequencyVc(wi)
= log(#gateway #logs contain event wi⁄ ), where 
ec(w1) = Term − frequencyVc(wi) ∗ inverse − log − frequencyVc(wi) 
The selection of similarity metric is an important step in STR protocol. Since an ap-
propriate metric will be able to capture the hidden similarity between all sanitized 
records of every gateway. For this reason, we employed the Dice similarity metric. 
Let Vc(Vd) to be two event vectors respectively for two gateways C and D then: 
GatewaysSimilarity(Vc, Vd) = 2|Vc ∩ Vd| |Vc|
2 + |Vd|
2⁄  
In simple words, every two gateways C and D can be considered similar to each other 
if they are sharing many sanitized records with each other. Accordingly, the STR 
protocol should be able to infer that these two gateways should be belonging to the 
same virtual threat group. It is worth mentioning that any sensitive events will not be 
published and will be stored in an encrypted form at the smart homeowner side. The 
processes for the STR can be described as follows:  
 For each threat hunting procedure, every two gateways 𝐶, 𝐷 ∈ 𝑉 own a set of 
event vectors ec(wi) and ed(wi). Each one of them executes a predefined hash 
function denoted by h on its own set of event vectors to generate new hashed 
sets Vc = h( ec(wi)) and Vd = h( ed(wi)) respectively. CMCTH hosted on the 
gateway C will generate a two pair of encryption key E and decryption key U. 
CMCTH shares this encryption key E with the other gateway D. Computing the 
similarity between every two gateways is done by calculating two steps. The 
first one, is to compute the numerator, and the second one is to compute the de-
nominator. 
 For the correct execution of the STR protocol, one of the smart home’s gate-
ways should be selected as a trusted node for the aggregation process. Thereaf-
ter, topological ring formation is built between all of these gateways who de-
cided to participate in the threat hunting in order to receive the calculated nu-
merator values. 
 The masking agent running on gateway D starts to hide Vd by executing  
Bd = {ed(wi) × r
D|wi ∈  Vd} where r is a random number for every event in 
its event log wi. After finishing this step, the gateway D sends its Bd to the 
gateway C. 
 After the gateway C receives correctly Bd. The masking agent at gateway C 
starts to sign Bd using its private key to obtain the signature Sd. Gateway C 
sends Sd again to the gateway D in the same order as it has received it before. 
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The CMCTH running at the gateway D start the process of divulging the re-
ceived event set Sdby utilizing its r values to obtain the real signature SId of the 
gateway D.  the gateway C starts to implement the predefined hash function h 
on the real signature SId to obtain the set SIHd = H(SId). 
 The masking agent running on the gateway C also signs the event set Vc to get 
the signature set SIc. Additionally, masking agent implements the same prede-
fined hash function h on the signature set  SIc to form a new set SIHc = H(SIc). 
The CMCTH on the gateway C submits the calculated values back to the gate-
way D. 
 The masking agent at the gateway D  initiates a comparison process between the 
two hashed sets SIHd and SIHc based on the knowledge it previously owns 
from  Vd. The gateway D obtains the result of the intersection process between 
the two sets INC,D = SIHc ∩ SIHd which presents the interaction set between 
the two event sets of both of the gateways C, and D which will be denoted by 
|Vc ∩ VD|. CMCTH at the gateway D applies the predefined hash function h on 
the interaction set INC,D. After finishing the previous step, the gateway D en-
crypts with the public key of the trusted node the calculated hashed set along 
with the size of two sets |VD|, |VC| and the gateways’ pseudonyms identities. 
This encrypted data is later will be sent to the trusted node of this threat group. 
 Finally, after collecting all of these intermediate results from every pairs of 
gateways at the trusted node. The trusted node starts the process of decrypting 
them, then after runs cluster analysis on these values using the S-seeds cluster-
ing algorithm [20] to order to obtain different virtual threat groups      
The presented STR protocol performs all of these steps on 𝑚 hashed sanitized records 
that are distributed across 𝑚 parties without disclosing any of the raw values of these 
sanitized records.  
Secure Threat Insights (STI) Protocol 
The masking agent is the component within the CMCTH that is also responsible for 
implementing the second stage concealment protocol (STI protocol) on the extracted 
virtual threat groups obtained from the first stage concealment protocol (STR proto-
col). The idea of the STI protocol is to infer in a bilateral manner the set of correlated 
events exists between the sanitized records of event logs. The final output of this pro-
tocol aids in detecting the pertinent real-threat groups that exist within every virtual 
threat group. STI protocol is mainly based on our previous research work presented in 
[20, 21]. The main intuition of the STI protocol is to utilize the sets of frequent events 
that commonly exist between the event logs of multiple smart homes’ gateways. If 
one of these frequent sets is large enough, a real threat group is formed that has this 
set a main/core topic. For the correct execution of the STI protocol, a topological 
hierarchical formation should be built between all of these gateways who decided to 
participate in the threat hunting. This topological formation aids in finding similar real 
threat groups spanned around the various virtual threat groups. The processes for the 
STI can be described as follows: 
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 The STI protocol is usually started after the termination of the first stage con-
cealment protocol. However, it can also start by an indication from the CTI. 
The gateways in each virtual threat group confer together to elect one of them 
to act as a trusted node. The trusted node will be responsible for distributing its 
own catalog of 1-candidate frequent events. Upon receiving the 1-candidate 
frequent events, the gateways designate a local function hosted on the CMCTH 
to calculate their local frequent events on their sensitive event logs utilizing 
their own support and closure parameters. The algorithm discussed in [31] can 
run locally on every event logs to extract global & local frequent events of all 
event logs for the gateways within every virtual threat group.     
 For the gateways in the same virtual threat group ∀1
nPi, the gateway Pi start en-
crypting with its own key the locally extracted list of frequent events then sends 
this list to the second member Pi+1 in its virtual threat group, and so on for all 
gateways. 
 This process got repeated for all gateways until the last gateway in the virtual 
threat group Pn−1 submits all the collected lists to the elected trusted node of 
this virtual threat group. The trusted node begins to calculate the global support 
for the global frequent events by simply aggregating all the received local sup-
ports from the different gateways. Moreover, the global closure for the global 
frequent events can also be calculated by finding the intersection between all 
the received local closures from the different gateways.  
 The trusted node starts to encrypt and distribute the catalogs of global supports 
& closures in random order to the gateway Pn−1. The first gateway Pn−1 that re-
ceives these catalogs begins decrypting its own encrypted contribution using its 
own private key. After that, the gateway Pn−1 forwards these catalogs to anoth-
er gateway Pn−2 also in random order. Finally, the trusted node gets back these 
catalogs, but this time these catalogs are only encrypted with the trusted node’s 
own key. Therefore, final results can be generated.  
 The trusted node initializes a real-threat group 𝑅𝐶 for every adjacent set of 
global frequent events. These initial real-threat groups comprise all gateways 
that have these global frequent events in their event logs. In the beginning, 
these initial real-threat groups could be overlapped between multiple virtual 
threat groups. However, the continuous progress of STI, they will be merged 
together such that every set of global frequent events will be representative for 
one real-threat group. 
 For the event log of gateway Vi, the masking agent will need to assign an ap-
propriate initial real-threat group 𝑅𝐶( ci) by utilizing the following scoring 
function: SimilarityScore(RCi ← Vi) = [∑ er(wi) ∗ RC_support(wi) wi ] −
[∑ er(wi
′) ∗ VC_support(wi
′)wi
′ ].Where wi represent the global frequent event 
in the event log r also this global frequent event is common in an initial real-
threat group  RCi. The wi
′ is representing the global frequent event in the event 
log r and is not frequent in this initial real-threat group  RCi. After applying this 
scoring function on all event log of all gateways. At this point, every gateway 
will be able to determine its membership to an exactly one real-threat group. 
The representative of each real-threat group gets re-calculated based on the 
event logs of its current members.   
13 
 
 
 Inside every virtual threat group VC, the elected set of trusted nodes collaborate 
together to assemble a hierarchical structure of the real-threat groups, that have 
been extracted from the event logs of their members’ gateway. Each real-threat 
group can now be represented using the set of global frequent k-events, in such 
case; it will act as a main/core topic or simply a representative. In the hierar-
chical structure, the real-threat group owns k-frequent events will be placed at 
level k of this structure. The parent of this real-threat group at level k-1 will 
own k-1 frequent events, which is also a subset of the frequent events owned by 
its child at level k. We have utilized the previously mentioned scoring function 
to derive the nominee parent for every child real-threat group. In the end of the 
step, the list of extracted real-threat groups got distributed between all the trust-
ed nodes. This crucial step enables the integration of real-threat groups that own 
similar frequent events based on the inter-real threat group similarity and re-
moves the restrained threat groups based on the intra- threat group separation. 
The proposed new similarity metric for this task is similar to the scoring func-
tion used in the STR protocol. The only new variation introduced in here in the 
normalization process that is employed to exclude the effect of the size of the 
real-threat group on the final result. This new utilized metric can be expressed 
as follows:     
RCSimilarity(RCi←RCj) = [
SimilarityScore(RCi ← ∀x=1
n Vx ∈ RCj)
[∑ e(wj) + ∑ e(wj
′)wj
′wj
]
] + 1 
The 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 RC_ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝐶𝑖 ↔ 𝑅𝐶𝑗) = [RC_𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑅𝐶𝑖 ← 𝑅𝐶𝑗) ∗
 RC_𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑅𝐶𝑗 ← 𝑅𝐶𝑖)]. Where 𝑅𝐶𝑖 and 𝑅𝐶𝑗 are two real-threat groups; 
∀𝑥=1
𝑛 𝑉𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝐶𝑗 represents a single conceived event log for the real-threat 
group 𝑅𝐶𝑗 that contain all the event logs of its current members. 𝑤𝑗 stands for a 
global frequent event exists in both of  𝑅𝐶𝑖 and 𝑅𝐶𝑗 while the  𝑤𝑗
′  stands for a 
global frequent event exists only in the real-threat groups 𝑅𝐶𝑗 but not in 𝑅𝐶𝑖. 
Finally, 𝑒(𝑤𝑗) and 𝑒(𝑤𝑗
′) represent the weighted frequency of both of 𝑤𝑗 and 
𝑤𝑗
′ in the real-threat group 𝑅𝐶𝑗.  
 Finally, when a new smart homeowner decides to participate in a threat hunting 
process, He/she invokes his/her own CMCTH to download from the CTI the 
catalog of core points for the available real-threat groups. Later, CMCTH be-
gins the execution of the two-stage concealment protocols on the sensitive event 
logs stored at the smart homeowner’s gateway. The similarity between the 
owner’s sensitive event logs and the representatives of the real-threat groups 
can be computed locally at the homeowner's side. In the end, the CMCTH ranks 
all the similarity values then enroll its smart home’s gateway in the real-threat 
group with the highest similarity value. the CMCTH will start receiving infor-
mation related to the threat reputations of its owner usage events, the technical 
systems configurations of its owner will be automatically adjusted to prevent 
the occurrence of these threats and finally a set of threat analysis information 
will be provided to aid the smart homeowner in handling a certain chain of 
threats facing their crucial systems. Additionally, the smart homeowner can 
now get a detailed instruction related to mitigation and remediation procedures 
in the case of the occurrence of these threats. Finally, the CMCTH utilize the 
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cooperative nature of the real-threat groups to automatically generate new de-
tection and prevention rules for the current security solutions deployed at the 
smart homes. 
6 Experiments and Results 
The experiments presented in this research were performed on two Intel® ma-
chines connected using a local network. The Server has an Intel® Core i7 and the 
other machine has an Intel® Core 2 Duo. A data storage was done using a MySQL 
database for saving a set of event logs from various gateways. The CTI entity has 
been implemented as a web service. The CMCTH has been built as an applet to man-
age the various communications between the gateways themselves, and the interaction 
between the CTI and other gateways. The proposed two-stage concealment protocols 
were implemented using Java and boundycastel© library, RSA algorithm was used in 
encryption with key length of 512 for all experimental scenarios. The experiments 
have proceeded on a real smart home network that contains different IoT devices. In 
order to mimic a normal usage log, a dataset was pulled from an IPTV network which 
has been linked to another dataset containing 54 threat services of 30 IoT devices. The 
sanitized event logs were created based on recorded events. In order to measure the 
accomplished privacy level and the accuracy of results obtained using our system. We 
used precision and recall metrics as shown in Fig. (1). As noticed in the figure, good 
quality is attained when our solution identifies virtual threat groups first. These virtual 
threat groups will contain multiple sets of real-threat groups. With this way, our solu-
tion will be able to extract accurate information from the gateways who share the 
same data. Additionally, the impact of every sensitive event within the real threat 
group can be easily calculated. This will permit the CMCTH to extract and remove 
anomalies that are far from the common sanitized events.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig.1. Accuracy and Privacy of the Extracted Threat Reputations Groups 
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We have also measured the impact of leaked sensitive events from different gateways 
on privacy levels during the run of the two-stage concealment protocols. We assumed 
a set gateways intentionally disclosed a portion of their sensitive events in the sani-
tized event logs released for threat hunting. For every set of sensitive events; the at-
tack procedure mentioned in threat model was conducted with the aim of revealing 
other sensitive events stored in their sensitive event logs and based on the real-threat 
group they are belonging to. The obtained sensitive events were quantified and the 
results are shown in Fig. (1). As seen from the results, the proposed system can signif-
icantly reduce privacy leakages of the exposed sensitive events, However, the ex-
posed sensitive events will only be hashed hypernym phrases that are in the same 
semantic level of non-sensitive events. The real sensitive events of other smart home-
owners have already been suppressed from being released.  
7 Conclusions and Future Directions 
In this research work, a cognitive middleware for cooperative threat hunting 
(CMCTH) was presented which is hosted at the homeowners' gateways. CMCTH 
enroll the smart homeowners' gateways in a specialized threat hunting groups that 
permit the sharing of threat related information related to mitigation and remediation 
procedures in the case of the occurrence of these threats and also facilities the auto-
matic re-configurations of smart homeowners’ systems to prevent the occurrence of 
these threats. The formation of threat hunting groups is done without revealing any 
sensitive events logs to external entities. An overview of the two-stage concealment 
protocols was given. The performance of our solution was tested on a real dataset. 
The experimental results and the analysis clearly demonstrate that achieving higher 
privacy levels during the threat reputations processes is possible using our solution 
without the need to reduce the accuracy of the extracted threat reputations. A future 
research agenda for this research will include utilizing game theory to better compose 
virtual threat groups, multiple events publications and its impact on the privacy of the 
smart homeowners. 
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